CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FARM POLICY

Two types of public choice models have been applied to model the political economy of farm programs: the self-willed government (SWG) model and the clearinghouse government (CHG) model. In terms of theory, the two models are very similar but most analysts prefer the CHG model. In terms of empirical work, the CHG model has done a little more—but not much more—to further our understanding of the causes of farm programs. Reviewing the theoretical and applied literature indicates that one should extend and refine the models so as to allow explicitly for a larger number of interest groups (especially agribusiness and foreign interests), to allow multiple policy instruments to be applied jointly, and to explain the choice(s) of policy instruments jointly with the rate of protection.     

What Constitutes Evidence of Discrimination in Lending?

We analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. We show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.     

Gaming the IRS’ Third-Party Reporting System: Evidence from Pari-Mutuel Wagering

This study examines whether taxpayers intentionally avoid Internal Revenue Service (IRS) third-party reports. In 2017 an IRS amendment created a quasi-exogenous shock that reduced third-party tax reporting of pari-mutuel gambling winnings from certain types of wagers. I consider the effect that this rule change had on taxpayer behavior. Using a difference-in-differences research design comparing thoroughbred racing in the United States to Canada, I find a 27% increase in gambler's investment into wager-types that became less likely to trigger third-party reports. Further, I provide evidence that this effect was because of third-party reporting, not withholding, and was stronger in more informed gambling populations. These findings suggest that taxpayers knowingly avoid third-party reports, enabling underreporting of income to the IRS. This has important policy implications because underreported individual income is the largest driver of the $496 billion annual gap between legal tax liability and actual tax collections in the United States.